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BLYSTONE v. HORN : THE THIRD CIRCUIT GUARDS AGAINST
INADVERTENT WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO PRESENT
MITIGATING EVIDENCE DURING
A CAPITAL CASE
DYLAN J. SCHER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The fundamental right to effective representation is a cornerstone of
the criminal justice system, and at no time is that effective representation
more crucial than during the investigation and presentation of mitigating
evidence in a capital case.1  Because the death penalty is reserved for the
most heinous of crimes, inextricably interwoven in a capital case is a defen-
dant’s right to present mitigating evidence to demonstrate extenuating
circumstances that may justify a departure from the death penalty.2
* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Villanova University School of Law.  This Casebrief
would not have been possible without the love and support of my friends and
family.  Additionally, I would like to thank the members of Volume 58 of the
Villanova Law Review for their helpful feedback and comments.
1. See Dale E. Ho, Silent at Sentencing: Waiver Doctrine and a Capital Defendant’s
Right to Present Mitigating Evidence After Schriro v. Landrigan, 62 FLA. L. REV. 721,
725, 735 (2010) (explaining that right to present mitigating evidence during capi-
tal case “is grounded firmly in the Court’s capital punishment jurisprudence, aris-
ing in response to . . . Eighth Amendment concerns”); Emily Hughes, Arbitrary
Death: An Empirical Study of Mitigation, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 581, 582 (2012) (“A
capital jury’s opportunity to consider mitigating evidence is one of the critical pro-
cedures the Supreme Court has endorsed to alleviate arbitrariness in the jury’s
decision of whether a defendant deserves to die.”).  Proper investigation of mitigat-
ing evidence is an immense task. See Ursula Bentele & William J. Bowers, How
Jurors Decide on Death: Guilt Is Overwhelming; Aggravation Requires Death; and Mitiga-
tion Is No Excuse, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1011, 1055 (2001) (explaining challenges in
developing mitigating evidence, calling it “an extraordinarily complicated and dif-
ficult task that requires the skillful blending of lay and expert testimony”).
2. See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring) (explaining that mitigating evidence, including defendant’s “disadvantaged
background” or “emotional and mental problems,” is extremely significant to con-
sider in capital cases because it may indicate that particular defendant is less culpa-
ble than others who lack this type of “excuse”).  In the broadest sense, mitigating
evidence is any type of factor that could cause a jury to issue anything less than the
death penalty. See Craig M. Cooley, Mapping the Monster’s Mental Health and Social
History: Why Capital Defense Attorneys and Public Defender Death Penalty Units Require the
Services of Mitigation Specialists, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 23, 51–52 (2005) (explain-
ing role mitigating evidence plays in sentencing phase of death penalty case).  The
Supreme Court has identified a non-exhaustive list of potential mitigating factors.
See id. at 48 (“[M]itigating factors have included such things as family history;
youthfulness; underdeveloped intellect and maturity; favorable prospects for reha-
bilitation; poverty; military service; cooperation with authorities; character; prior
criminal history; mental capacity; age; and good behavior while awaiting trial.”)
(footnotes omitted).
(869)
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Therefore, the presentation of mitigating evidence is a critical juncture in
a capital case.3  Put simply, if a defendant does not present any mitigating
evidence during the trial or sentencing phase, the defendant faces a
highly unfavorable outcome and decreases his or her chance of avoiding
the death penalty.4
Investigating and presenting mitigating evidence is not an easy task,
as a surprising number of “uncooperative” defendants facing the death
penalty hinder a defense counsel’s attempt to gather or present the evi-
dence.5  Further, it is not uncommon for defendants in capital cases to be
poorly represented.6  Inadequate representation, coupled with the com-
plexities involved in investigating and presenting mitigating evidence,
leads many defendants seeking post-sentencing relief to file claims for in-
effective assistance of counsel regarding their representation at the sen-
tencing phase of a capital case.7  Often, this type of claim hinges on
whether the defendant waived the right to present mitigating evidence,
which, under the current Supreme Court jurisprudence, procedurally bars
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.8
3. See Robin M. Maher, The ABA and the Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitiga-
tion Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763, 771–72
(2008) (“Developing mitigation evidence and making a case for the life of their
client is one of the most important tasks defense lawyers must handle.”); see also
Ho, supra note 1, at 724 (explaining right to present mitigating evidence “repre- R
sents a defendant’s last line of defense against the imposition of the death pen-
alty”); Leading Cases, Sixth Amendment—Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Schriro v.
Landrigan, 121 HARV. L. REV. 255, 263 (2007) [hereinafter Leading Cases] (“Miti-
gating evidence is one of the most important checks ensuring that the state im-
poses the death penalty only when it ‘has adequate assurance that the punishment
is justified.’”) (citation omitted).
4. See Kamela Nelan, Restricting Waivers of the Presentation of Mitigating Evidence
by Incompetent Death Penalty “Volunteers”, 27 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 24, 24 (2008)
(“An equally significant means by which a defendant can achieve execution is to
forgo presenting mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of the trial,
making the imposition of a death sentence a virtual certainty.”); see also Cooley,
supra note 2, at 33 (“Typically, one’s life will only be spared when sufficient mitigat- R
ing evidence is presented to outweigh the State’s aggravating evidence.”).
5. Leading Cases, supra note 3, at 255 (“Capital defendants are not always coop- R
erative or repentant, even at sentencing hearings determinative of their fates.
Some death penalty defendants may refuse to aid in investigation of mitigating
evidence, or they may actively obstruct presentation of it during the sentencing
phase.”).
6. See Cooley, supra note 2, at 24 (“[M]any capital defendants get no meaning- R
ful support at the sentencing phase . . . for this reason, claims of . . . ineffectiveness
at the penalty phase are among the most common issues raised in habeas corpus
petitions by inmates on death row.”) (alterations in original) (quoting Ira Mick-
enberg, Ineffective Counsel, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 4, 2003, at S9).
7. For a discussion regarding the history of the development of the ineffective
assistance of counsel claim see infra notes 27–50 and the accompanying text.
8. See Ho, supra note 1, at 724 (explaining that once it is determined that R
defendant waived right to present mitigating evidence, claim for ineffective assis-
tance of counsel is procedurally barred).
2
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Recently, in Schriro v. Landrigan,9 the Supreme Court addressed the
impact of an uncooperative defendant’s actions on the presentation of
mitigating evidence during capital sentencing and alluded to what may
constitute a defendant’s waiver of the right to present mitigating evi-
dence.10  Numerous commentators have argued that the majority’s deci-
sion was a major setback for defendants’ rights because it implies that a
defendant could waive the right to present mitigating evidence without
fully knowing or understanding the consequences of the decision.11
Schriro left lower courts in a difficult position; they now must carefully navi-
gate the determination of whether a defendant waived the right to present
mitigating evidence while balancing the need to protect defendants’ rights
in capital cases.12
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit limited the
potentially dangerous consequences of the Supreme Court’s precedent by
narrowly interpreting Schriro, confining its applicability to its specific set of
facts.13  The Third Circuit’s approach affords uncooperative defendants
substantial leeway before finding a valid waiver of the right to present miti-
gating evidence.14  Further, the Third Circuit’s approach requires defense
counsel to exercise heightened caution in deciding how to proceed in the
sentencing phase of a capital case.15
This Casebrief will not delve into the contentious issues surrounding
the efficacy and morality of the death penalty, nor will it deal with the first
9. 550 U.S. 465 (2007).
10. See id. at 472–73 (explaining issues that Supreme Court would consider
for this case).
11. See Ho, supra note 1, at 725 (“The Court’s failure in [Schriro] to apply a R
similar standard where a capital defendant ‘waives’ his right to present mitigating
evidence is incongruous with well-established waiver doctrine, and creates an unac-
ceptable risk of error in capital sentencing.”); Leading Cases, supra note 3, at 255,
264–65 (2007) (explaining that Schriro represents departure from prior trend to-
wards protecting right to present mitigating evidence and warns that if Schriro’s
decision is continued to be adhered to or expanded it “will have deplorable conse-
quences for the rights of capital defendants”).
12. See Ho, supra note 1, at 760 (“In absence of a clear ruling from the Su- R
preme Court, however, the lower courts have issued widely varying rulings on this
particular issue and have applied inconsistent standards in determining when the
right to mitigation has been validly waived.”).
13. See generally Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 425 (3d Cir. 2011); Thomas v.
Horn, 570 F.3d 105 (3d Cir. 2009); Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416 (3d Cir. 2007).
For a detailed discussion on the development and current state of the Third Cir-
cuit’s jurisprudence regarding mitigating evidence, see infra notes 53–91 and ac- R
companying text.
14. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s approach to handling uncoopera-
tive defendants during the penalty phase of a capital case who subsequently file a
claim for ineffective representation, see infra notes 95–129 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s approach to the actions of the de-
fense counsel during sentencing in a capital case, see infra notes 118–29 and ac-
companying text.
3
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phase of a capital case, the guilt phase.16  Instead, through an analysis of
the recent case Blystone v. Horn,17 this brief will focus on the Third Cir-
cuit’s interpretation of the effect of a recalcitrant defendant during a capi-
tal case in two respects: the effect that uncooperative actions have on
waiving a defendant’s rights to present mitigating evidence, and the re-
sponsibilities of the defense counsel regarding mitigating evidence when
representing an uncooperative defendant.18
Part II of this brief traces the history of the effective representation
requirement and the impact of a recalcitrant defendant on capital cases
through the related Supreme Court jurisprudence.19  Part III evaluates
and explains the decision in Blystone v. Horn and related Third Circuit
cases in light of the Supreme Court’s recent guidance.20  Part IV explains
the implications for a practitioner in the Third Circuit.21  Finally, Part V
argues that the Third Circuit’s approach to handling questions of waiver
and effective representation of counsel during the sentencing phase of a
capital case is necessary to protect defendants.22
16. See Cooley, supra note 2, at 24–25 (discussing increased awareness of capi- R
tal punishment by American public attributable to flaws in system).  It should be
noted that there are two distinct phases in a capital case: the guilt phase and pen-
alty phase. See Nelan, supra note 4, at 28 (explaining that capital trials can be R
broken down into two components: guilt phase, where defendant’s innocence or
guilt is determined, and penalty phase, where appropriate penalty is determined).
It is worth noting that capital punishment remains a prominent public issue with
commentators illustrating many of the problems associated with the death penalty
system. See, e.g., Steven F. Shatz, The Eighth Amendment, the Death Penalty, and Ordi-
nary Robbery-Burglary Murderers: A California Case Study, 59 FLA. L. REV. 719, 768
(2007) (“Overbroad definitions of death-eligibility can be seen as the root cause of
most of the problems with the death penalty.”).
17. 664 F.3d 425 (3d Cir. 2011).
18. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s approach to waiving the right to
present mitigating evidence, see infra notes 95–117 and accompanying text.  For a
discussion of the requirements of defense counsel during the mitigating phase of a
capital case in the Third Circuit, see infra notes 118–29 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the development of the Supreme Court’s effective rep-
resentation and mitigating evidence jurisprudence, see infra notes 23–50 and ac- R
companying text.
20. For an explanation and analysis of the Third Circuit’s decisions in Taylor,
Thomas, and Blystone, see infra notes 51–91 and accompanying text. R
21. For a discussion of the practical ramifications for practitioners, including
an explanation of the requirements to satisfy the effective representation threshold
in the Third Circuit, see infra notes 92–129 and accompanying text.
22. For the argument that the Third Circuit applies a proper approach to
protect defendants’ rights during the sentencing phase, see infra notes 130–37 and R
accompanying text.  For a recommendation that the Third Circuit take a further
step in protecting defendants’ rights by adopting a “knowing and voluntary” re-
quirement to waiver of mitigating evidence at capital sentencing, see infra notes
138–44 and accompanying text. R
4
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II. BACKGROUND
This section provides a general overview of the development and sub-
sequent implementation of the right to effective assistance of counsel.23
First, this section briefly reviews the establishment of the right to effective
assistance of counsel.24  Second, this section examines the Supreme
Court’s application of the right to effective assistance of counsel in the
mitigating evidence phase.25  Finally, the focus of this section turns to a
survey of the Supreme Court’s approach to the right of effective assistance
of counsel when a defendant acts in an uncooperative manner.26
A. Establishment of Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to effective assistance of
counsel.27  In 1984, the Supreme Court addressed the standard for evalu-
ating ineffective representation claims in Strickland v. Washington.28  In
Strickland, the respondent confessed to three murders and was sentenced
to death.29  Following the sentence, the “respondent sought collateral re-
lief,” claiming, among other grounds, that his counsel provided ineffective
assistance during the sentencing phase.30
23. For a general overview of the right to effective assistance of counsel and
the subsequent implications, see infra notes 27–50 and the accompanying text. R
24. For a brief history of the establishment of the right to effective assistance
of counsel, see infra notes 27–35 and the accompanying text. R
25. For an overview of the Supreme Court’s application of the right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel in the mitigating evidence phase, see infra notes 36–39 R
and accompanying text.
26. For an overview of the Supreme Court’s approach to a recalcitrant defen-
dant’s right to effective assistance of counsel, see infra notes 40–50 and accompa- R
nying text.
27. See Cooley, supra note 2, at 70 (explaining historical development and R
recognition of right to assistance of counsel under Sixth Amendment).
28. 466 U.S. 668, 683 (1984) (acknowledging that this case represents Su-
preme Court’s first review of attorney’s ineffective assistance of representation
claim).  The right to effective assistance of counsel assumes the constitutional right
to counsel that has been established through a long line of Supreme Court cases
dating back to 1932. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340–41 (1963)
(explaining that right to counsel is afforded in state proceeding through incorpo-
ration of Sixth Amendment through Fourteenth Amendment); Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 467–69 (1938) (determining that only legitimate waiver of counsel
can vitiate right to counsel); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (holding
that trial judge must appoint counsel for defendants when they cannot employ
counsel).
29. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 671–75 (reviewing facts of case).  As part of an
overall strategy, respondent’s attorney chose not to look for certain evidentiary
items and limited the evidence presented at sentencing to a plea colloquy between
the respondent and the trial judge. See id. at 673 (reviewing facts of case).
30. See id. at 675 (explaining that respondent sought relief for ineffective as-
sistance of counsel because his attorney “failed to move for a continuance to pre-
pare for sentencing, to request a psychiatric report, to investigate and present
character witnesses, to seek a presentence investigation report, to present mean-
ingful arguments to the sentencing judge, and to investigate the medical exam-
iner’s reports or cross-examine the medical experts”).  The claim eventually made
5
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For the first time, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to address
squarely the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel.31  The Court estab-
lished a two-prong test to evaluate ineffective assistance of counsel claims:
a defendant must prove (1) “deficient” performance by the attorney, and
(2) that the deficient performance “prejudiced the defense.”32  A coun-
sel’s performance is “deficient” when the attorney fails to represent a cli-
ent in a reasonable manner.33  Even if an attorney’s representation is
unreasonable, however, this will not warrant “setting aside the judgment of
a criminal proceeding” unless the unreasonable representation also
prejudiced the ultimate result.34  Therefore, once a defendant proves that
the defense counsel did not satisfy the reasonableness standard in the first
prong of the Strickland test, the defendant must then demonstrate “that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional er-
rors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”35
B. Supreme Court Applies Strickland Reasonableness Prong
to Mitigating Evidence
Mitigating evidence serves a vital role in capital cases, theoretically
ensuring that the death sentence is reserved for the absolute worst
its way to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (part of which is now the
Eleventh Circuit) where the Fifth Circuit delineated a framework for evaluating
ineffective representation claims and remanded the case based on the new criteria.
See id. at 680–83 (reviewing Fifth Circuit’s attempt to create standard to evaluate
ineffective assistance of counsel claims).
31. See id. at 683 (“[T]he Court has never directly and fully addressed a claim
of ‘actual ineffectiveness’ of counsel’s assistance in a case going to trial.”).
32. See id. at 687 (explaining two-prong test to evaluate ineffective representa-
tion claims).
33. See id. at 687–88 (emphasizing that to establish first prong of Strickland test
“the defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness”).
34. See id. at 692 (“Accordingly, any deficiencies in counsel’s performance
must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance
under the Constitution.”).
35. See id. at 694–95 (explaining appropriate standard to determine whether
counsel’s unreasonable representation prejudiced defendant’s case).  Commenta-
tors have criticized the Strickland standard as highly deferential to defense attor-
neys’ decisions, cultivating an environment that fosters bad lawyering. See William
S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland’s Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Undermining of
the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91, 94 (1995) (explaining that Strick-
land standard has been criticized for permitting “abysmal lawyering”).  Geimer de-
tails the problems that the Strickland standard presents. See id. at 114 (calling
Strickland standard “an illogical and unworkable framework for evaluating whether
the performance of defense counsel had fallen below a constitutionally required
minimum”); see also Adam Lamparello, Establishing Guidelines for Attorney Representa-
tion of Criminal Defendants at the Sentencing Phase of Capital Trials, 62 ME. L. REV. 97,
99–101 (2010) (detailing significant deficiencies with Strickland standard).
6
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crimes.36  In Gregg v. Georgia,37 the Supreme Court held that mitigating
evidence is a foundational requirement for death penalty statutes to be
constitutional.38  Since Gregg, the Supreme Court has provided guidance
on a case-by-case basis regarding what constitutes a reasonable investiga-
tion and presentation of mitigating evidence.39
C. Schriro v. Landrigan: Effect of Recalcitrant Defendant on Attorney’s Duty
to Investigate and Present Mitigating Evidence
The Strickland standard is more difficult to apply when unpredictable
variables, such as an uncooperative defendant, are added to a capital
case.40  In the 2007 case Schriro, the Supreme Court revisited mitigating
evidence in a capital case, and for the first time, the Court addressed the
issue of an effective investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence
when a client obstructs the investigation or advises defense counsel not to
36. See Ho, supra note 1, at 725 (explaining that components of death penalty R
cases must be structured to reserve capital punishment for worst offenders);
Maher, supra note 3, at 768 (“Mitigation evidence took center stage in death pen-
alty cases as potentially the only way defense counsel could humanize their client
and save his life.”); Nelan, supra note 4, at 49 (explaining vital role mitigating R
evidence serves in capital cases).
37. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
38. See id. at 193, 206–07 (emphasizing key role of mitigation in new death
penalty statutes that Court found constitutional); see also Hughes, supra note 1, at R
582 (“A capital jury’s opportunity to consider mitigating evidence is one of the
critical procedures the Supreme Court has endorsed to alleviate arbitrariness in
the jury’s decision of whether a defendant deserves to die.”).  Interestingly, com-
mentators have argued that mitigating evidence actually does little to rid capital
cases of arbitrary results. See id. at 587 (explaining that because of the lack of
uniformity in mitigating evidence investigation, arbitrariness remains in capital
sentencing decisions); see also Jesse Cheng, Frontloading Mitigation: The “Legal” and
the “Human” in Death Penalty Defense, 35 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 39, 44 (2010)
(“[A]nalysts have observed that for all the ado about proceduralizing the death
penalty, the judiciary’s uneven regulation of capital punishment has done little to
alter the reality of arbitrary decision making.”).
39. See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 377 (2005) (holding that under
reasonableness prong of Strickland test, defense counsel must not rely on defen-
dant and defendant’s family’s claims that no mitigating evidence exists, and must
conduct review of evidence that prosecutor is likely to use “as evidence of aggrava-
tion at the trial’s sentencing phase”); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522–27
(2003) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel chose not to pre-
sent mitigating evidence because that decision was unreasonable and could not
have been strategic in light of counsel’s deficient investigation into available miti-
gating evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395–96 (2000) (concluding that
defense counsel’s failure to present evidence that defendant was “‘borderline
mentally retarded,’” and that defendant assisted law enforcement while in prison,
and failure to use witnesses which would cast defendant in favorable terms,
amounted to unreasonable conduct and ultimately did not meet Strickland stan-
dard of effective representation) (citation omitted).
40. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 478 (2007) (explaining difficulties
involved in deciding case of ineffective counsel where defendant is recalcitrant).
7
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present mitigating evidence at sentencing.41  In Schriro, the respondent
escaped from prison, committed a homicide, and was convicted of first-
degree murder.42  At the respondent’s request, his ex-wife and birth
mother did not testify during the sentencing phase, and the defense coun-
sel did not present any other mitigating evidence.43
In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court focused primarily on the
prejudice prong of the Strickland test and held that any failure in the inves-
tigation by the defense attorney did not prejudice the respondent.44  The
respondent’s specific requests to not have his birth mother or ex-wife tes-
tify and his colloquy with the trial judge made clear that he did not intend
or want to present any mitigating evidence.45  Thus, any failure by his at-
torney could not have prejudiced his case under the second Strickland
prong.46
According to the dissent, however, it was uncontroverted that the de-
fense counsel’s investigation into possible mitigating evidence was insuffi-
cient and failed the reasonableness prong of the Strickland test.47  Further,
the dissenters focused on whether the respondent produced a “knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary” waiver of his right to present mitigating evi-
dence.48  The dissent argued that this informed and knowing standard
exists for a valid waiver of all constitutionally protected rights, even if the
Court has not specifically and affirmatively applied the standard to the
right to present mitigating evidence.49  Thus, because the defendant did
not know that he was waiving his right to present mitigating evidence, he
41. See id. (explaining that Supreme Court has never addressed case “in which
a client interferes with counsel’s efforts to present mitigating evidence to a sen-
tencing court”).
42. See id. at 469–71 (reviewing facts of case).
43. See id. (reviewing facts of case and specifically recounting respondent’s
actions at sentencing hearing).
44. See id. at 473 (remanding case for evidentiary hearing regarding ineffec-
tive representation claim).  Before the case reached the Supreme Court, the Ninth
Circuit delivered an en banc decision concluding that the respondent produced a
“colorable claim” that he was provided with ineffective assistance of counsel during
the sentencing phase of his capital case. See id. at 472 (reviewing procedural his-
tory of case).
45. See id. at 469–70 (describing defendant’s refusal to allow his birth mother
and ex-wife to testify, and recounting colloquy between trial judge and defendant
regarding defendant’s wish not to present this type of mitigating evidence).
46. See id. at 480–81 (concluding that defendant “could not establish
prejudice”).
47. See id. at 482 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Significant mitigating evidence—
evidence that may well have explained respondent’s criminal conduct and unruly
behavior at his capital sentencing hearing—was unknown at the time of
sentencing.”).
48. See id. at 484 (explaining that constitutional right can only be waived in
the limited circumstances when defendant makes “knowing, intelligent, and volun-
tary” decision).
49. See id. at 486 (acknowledging Court had never specifically applied in-
formed and knowing standard to defendant’s right to produce mitigating
evidence).
8
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did not forfeit his protections or claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel.50
III. TAYLOR V. HORN,51 THOMAS V. HORN,52 AND BLYSTONE: THE THIRD
CIRCUIT BROADLY SAFEGUARDS A DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO
PRESENT MITIGATING EVIDENCE
Since the 2007 Supreme Court ruling in Schriro, the Third Circuit has
decided three cases involving the effect of a recalcitrant defendant who
interferes with a defense counsel’s efforts to investigate and present miti-
gating evidence.53  Through an examination of these cases, this section
tracks the development of the Third Circuit’s approach to the ability of
recalcitrant clients to waive their right to present mitigating evidence.54
Although the Third Circuit could have interpreted Schriro’s holding
broadly and significantly restricted the protection offered to defendants in
capital cases, the court instead chose to limit Schriro’s application to cases
where defendants undeniably waive their rights.55
A. Taylor and Thomas Establish Foundation for Third Circuit’s Approach
In 2007, the Third Circuit heard Taylor v. Horn, where the defendant
pled guilty to murdering his wife, two children, mother-in-law, and his
mother-in-law’s child.56  Pursuant to the defendant’s wishes, the defense
attorney did not present any mitigating evidence beyond merely mention-
ing that the defendant had no prior criminal record.57  The defendant
was sentenced to death, and after a lengthy appeals process, the case
reached the Third Circuit.58
50. See id. at 486–87, 491–92 (concluding that defendant could not have
waived his right to present mitigating evidence because he did not understand or
know implications of his decisions).
51. 504 F.3d 416 (3d Cir. 2007).
52. 570 F.3d 105 (3d Cir. 2009).
53. See Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 425, 425 (3d Cir. 2011) (representing most
recent case since Schriro to examine effect of recalcitrant defendant on right to
present mitigating evidence); Thomas, 570 F.3d at 105 (representing second case
since Schriro to examine effect of recalcitrant defendant on right to present miti-
gating evidence); Taylor, 504 F.3d 416 (representing first case since Schriro to ex-
amine effect of recalcitrant defendant on right to present mitigating evidence).
54. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s approach to the ability of recalci-
trant clients to waive their right to present mitigating evidence, see infra notes
95–116 and accompanying text. R
55. See Bradley A. MacLean, Effective Capital Defense Representation and the Diffi-
cult Client, 76 TENN. L. REV. 661, 671 (2009) (“Justice Thomas’s opinion in Landri-
gan threatens to give lower courts justification to take a myopic view of the scope
and nature of capital defense counsel’s duties.”).
56. See Taylor, 504 F.3d at 420 (explaining facts of case).
57. See id. at 422 (detailing facts regarding defendant’s decisions during sen-
tencing hearing).
58. See id. at 422–25 (outlining procedural history of case following trial
judge’s imposition of death sentence).
9
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Relying on Schriro, the court concluded that based on the defendant’s
actions during sentencing, he had waived his right to present mitigating
evidence, effectively barring his post-sentencing claim of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel.59  In reaching this conclusion, the court highlighted that
the defendant (1) wrote in a confession letter that he wanted “the maxi-
mum sentence,” (2) instructed his attorney “not to contact any witnesses
or medical personnel” that he had spoken to, (3) affirmed that he under-
stood that the likely result of not presenting mitigating evidence would be
the “imposition of the death penalty,” and (4) declined to present any
mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing.60  Further, the court held
that the defendant was informed and knowing when he waived his right to
present mitigating evidence.61
In 2009, the Third Circuit revisited the issue in Thomas v. Horn, and
held that no valid waiver existed when the defendant exhibited a lower
degree of recalcitrant behavior than the defendants in Taylor and Schriro.62
During trial, the defendant was found guilty of murder, rape, involuntary
deviate sexual intercourse, and burglary.63  The defendant refused to pre-
sent evidence in the form of witness testimony and refused to stipulate to
uncontroverted facts such as his age.64  Unlike in Taylor, however, the
court determined that the defendant did not waive his right to present
mitigating evidence at sentencing and therefore was not procedurally
barred from making a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.65
In Thomas, the court distinguished Taylor and Schriro based on the
degree of the defendant’s recalcitrant behavior.66  In Thomas, the defen-
59. See id. at 455 (explaining that defendant’s decision to waive right to pre-
sent mitigating evidence was clear and “informed and knowing”).
60. See id. at 421–22 (illustrating multiple factors that led court to conclude
that defendant had waived his right to present mitigating evidence which, in effect,
barred claim of ineffective assistance of counsel).
61. See id. at 447 (“We will therefore affirm the District Court’s decision that
these waivers were knowing and voluntary.”).
62. See Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105, 122, 129 (3d Cir. 2009) (outlining
issues to be considered on appeal including ineffective assistance of counsel claim
and ultimately holding that defendant’s behavior did not equate to waiver of right
to present mitigating evidence).
63. See id. at 112–13 (explaining procedural history of case).
64. See id. at 128–29 (detailing facts pertinent to sentencing phase of case).
65. See id. at 129 (holding that defendant’s conduct did not rise to level of
waiver of right to present all mitigating evidence, which meant that possibility re-
mained that defense counsel’s performance prejudiced case).
66. See id. at 126–27 (highlighting facts distinguishing Schriro and Taylor from
Thomas).  The court focused in particular on the extent and scope of the defend-
ants’ actions and whether the actions amounted to complete waiver of right to
present mitigating evidence. See id. at 127 (distinguishing behaviors of Thomas de-
fendant from prior cases).  The court determined that in Taylor and Schriro, the
defendants’ waivers were manifestly apparent while in Thomas, it would be too
great a leap to classify the defendant’s actions as qualifying as a complete waiver.
See id. at 129 (“Therefore, we cannot conclude that Thomas’ conduct at sentencing
eliminated all possibility that counsel’s performance caused him prejudice.”).
10
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dant merely decided not to take the stand himself, rather than refuse to
present any mitigating evidence like the defendants in Taylor and Schriro.67
The Third Circuit determined that the defendant’s actions only resulted
in a waiver of the presentation of certain types of mitigating evidence but
could not be reasonably construed as a complete waiver of the right to
present all mitigating evidence.68
B. Blystone Solidifies Third Circuit’s Position on Defendant Waiver
The Third Circuit solidified its approach to handling an uncoopera-
tive defendant in Blystone v. Horn.69  The facts of Blystone represented the
perfect storm—an inexperienced public defender and a defendant who
was uncooperative during the sentencing phase of the capital case.70  A
thorough analysis of Blystone reveals important facts and circumstances
that illustrate the Third Circuit’s position on recalcitrant defendants and
their right to waive mitigating evidence.71
1. Background Facts and Procedure
In 1983, Scott Wayne Blystone picked up Smithburger, a hitchhiker,
and asked him to contribute money for gas.72  When Smithburger told
Blystone that he could only contribute a few dollars, Blystone told him to
get out of the car and proceeded to shoot him six times.73  At trial, Blys-
tone was found guilty of murder.74
Blystone’s defense counsel performed a limited investigation into pos-
sible mitigating evidence, interviewing only four people.75  At sentencing,
67. See id. at 126–28 (explaining behaviors of defendants in Taylor and Schriro
as compared to defendant in Thomas who did not refuse to present all mitigating
evidence, but only opposed testifying on his own behalf).
68. See id. (explaining that defendant’s refusal to present some evidence does
not justify Commonwealth’s argument that defendant would have refused to pre-
sent all mitigating evidence).
69. 664 F.3d 397, 426–27 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that district court’s determi-
nation that defendant waived right to present all mitigating evidence was unrea-
sonable and that defendant’s claim of ineffective representation was not barred).
70. See id. at 402–04 (explaining facts of case and in particular, noting that
defendant refused to present some mitigating evidence and that defense counsel
had only been working as public defender for three months).
71. For a discussion and analysis of Blystone’s impact on the Third Circuit, see
infra notes 72–129.
72. See Blystone, 664 F.3d at 402 (recounting facts of case).
73. See id. (same).
74. See id. at 403 (“On June 13, 1984, a jury empaneled by the Court of Com-
mon Pleas of Fayette County, Pennsylvania, convicted [defendant] of first-degree
murder, robbery, conspiracy to commit murder, and conspiracy to commit
robbery.”).
75. See id. at 404–05 (noting limited nature of investigation for mitigating evi-
dence).  Blystone’s attorney interviewed Blystone, his parents, and one of his sis-
ters. See id. at 405 (explaining Blystone’s defense counsel’s investigation for
mitigating evidence).  Blystone’s attorney did not intend to present any testimony
elicited from Blystone’s family members even though the conversations described
11
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the defense counsel explained to the court that Blystone did not want to
present any mitigating evidence.76  The judge conducted a colloquy with
Blystone to ensure that Blystone understood the consequences of his deci-
sion not to bring in the mitigating evidence.77
After the court sentenced Blystone to death, he filed a petition under
the Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel.78  At the PCRA evidentiary hearing, Blystone
presented significant evidence that could have served as mitigating evi-
dence if Blystone had the benefit of an adequate investigation and effec-
tive assistance of counsel.79  However, the court held that Blystone’s
defense counsel’s investigation was not deficient.80  The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court affirmed the PCRA court’s decision and further concluded
that Blystone waived his right to present mitigating evidence.81  Thus, the
failures of his defense counsel at trial did not cause him prejudice.82
extensive behavior abnormalities and substance abuse issues. See id. at 405–06
(describing family members’ description of Blystone’s troubled past).
76. See id. at 403 (recounting facts of case).  Blystone’s attorney told the court
that he and Blystone previously engaged in lengthy discussions regarding the con-
sequences of not presenting any mitigating evidence at trial. See id. (noting de-
fense attorney’s assertion that he and Blystone discussed “the benefits of
presenting a mitigation case”).  Furthermore, the defense counsel expressed a
strong desire to put Blystone’s parents on the stand. See id. (describing facts from
record).
77. See id. at 403–04 (explaining that following colloquy, judge determined
that Blystone understood consequences of his decision).  For a more detailed dis-
cussion of the colloquy between Blystone and the trial judge, and the significance
of some of the specific questions asked in colloquies during the penalty phase of a
capital case in the Third Circuit, see infra notes 102–10 and accompanying text. R
78. See Blystone, 664 F.3d at 404 (explaining procedural history of case).
79. See id. at 404–08 (describing evidence presented by Blystone in attempt to
prove ineffective assistance of counsel during PCRA evidentiary hearing).
80. See id. at 408–09 (noting PCRA court denied Blystone’s petition because
sufficient evidence showed defense counsel conducted “sufficient investigation
into mitigating circumstances by reviewing all of the available discovery
materials”).
81. See id. at 409 (“‘The PCRA court determined that counsel conducted a
proper investigation into all possible mitigating circumstances, and we find sub-
stantial support in the record to uphold [that] determination.’”) (citation
omitted).
82. See id. at 408–09 (explaining Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision (cit-
ing Commonwealth v. Blystone, 725 A.2d 1197, 1206 (Pa. 1999))).  Prior to the
defendant seeking relief for ineffective assistance of counsel, the United States Su-
preme Court determined that the Pennsylvania statute mandating the death pen-
alty where aggravating circumstances exist and no mitigating evidence is presented
was constitutional and did not impermissibly limit the jury’s discretion in deciding
the penalty. See id. (noting Blystone’s constitutional challenge to Pennsylvania stat-
ute (citing Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 303 (1990))).  During the PCRA
hearing, Blystone presented numerous pieces of evidence to show that “his life
history was replete with potentially mitigating evidence, which [his attorney] could
have uncovered through a more extensive investigation of his background.” See id.
at 405 (discussing Blystone’s argument that further investigation by counsel would
have revealed such evidence).  Specifically, through a number of lay witnesses,
12
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2. Analysis of Ineffective Representation Claim Under Strickland Test
On appeal, the Third Circuit delved into the Strickland analysis.83
The court worked through the two prongs of the Strickland test separately
to develop the court’s stance on the interplay between effective assistance
of counsel and the impact of a recalcitrant defendant on the right to pre-
sent mitigating evidence.84  The court was able to harmonize prior deci-
sions to reach its ultimate conclusion.85
a. Strickland Reasonableness Prong
The Third Circuit quickly concluded that the investigation for miti-
gating circumstances failed the reasonableness prong of the Strickland
test.86  In reaching its conclusion, the court specifically called attention to
expert mental health testimony and institutional records, which were
“readily available” to the defense counsel had he performed a proper in-
vestigation.87  Finally, the failure to conduct a thorough investigation was
not part of a strategic choice that may otherwise have deserved greater
deference under the Strickland standard.88
b. Strickland Prejudice Prong
In analyzing the Strickland prejudice prong, the Third Circuit artfully
distinguished Blystone from the Supreme Court ruling in Schriro.89  In so
doing, the court was able to supply its own guidance on examining the
interchange between an uncooperative defendant and the subsequent im-
Blystone presented evidence that he suffered from malnutrition as a child, abused
alcohol, engaged in self-mutilation, suffered from untreated brain damage and
psychiatric disorders, was abused by his father, and was discharged from the Navy
for “‘[a]pathy and defective attitudes.’” See id. at 405–07 (alteration in original)
(citation omitted) (detailing results from Blystone’s own investigation for poten-
tially mitigating evidence).
83. See id. at 418 (“[The Third Circuit] evaluate[s] claims of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel using the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington”).
84. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s application of the Strickland analysis
in Blystone, see infra notes 86–91 and accompanying text.
85. For a discussion regarding the Third Circuit’s decision in Blystone, see in-
fra notes 86–91 and the accompanying text.
86. See Blystone, 665 F.3d at 420 (“We need not delve too deeply into the ques-
tion of whether Whiteko’s investigation prior to sentencing was deficient because
the Commonwealth’s brief all but concedes that it was.”).
87. See id. at 420–21 (demonstrating deficiencies in defense counsel’s investi-
gation and noting PCRA court’s determination that such investigations were ade-
quate was “objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the
proceedings before it”).
88. See id. at 423 (acknowledging that strategic choices are to be treated defer-
entially, yet concluding that defense counsel employed no such strategy during
investigation).
89. See id. at 426 (“Despite the Commonwealth’s extensive arguments to the
contrary, the facts of this case are clearly distinguishable from Schriro.”).
13
Scher: Blystone v. Horn: The Third Circuit Guards Against Inadvertent Wa
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-5\VLR505.txt unknown Seq: 14 15-OCT-13 12:26
882 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58: p. 869
pact on waiving mitigating evidence.90  The court reaffirmed Thomas,
which established that in order for a defendant to waive all rights to pre-
sent mitigating evidence, the defendant must unambiguously refuse to al-
low the defense attorney to present any mitigating evidence at
sentencing.91
IV. KEY FACTORS AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THIRD CIRCUIT
PRACTITIONERS STEMMING FROM BLYSTONE
This section explores several key points and practical implications for
practitioners as a result of the Third Circuit’s recent decisions involving
mitigating evidence.92  First, this section focuses on a defendant’s ability to
waive the right to present mitigating evidence.93  Second, this section ex-
amines the effect of a recalcitrant defendant on the defense counsel’s obli-
gation to investigate and present potentially mitigating evidence.94
A. Effect of Blystone on Defendant’s Ability to Waive Right to Present
Mitigating Evidence and Resulting Prejudice
Under Strickland Analysis
To limit the potentially perilous consequences of ambiguous waivers
on defendants in capital cases, the Third Circuit demonstrated that it will
limit Schriro’s application to those specific facts.95  For example, in Thomas
the Pennsylvania Commonwealth argued that Schriro was controlling
under the facts, the defendant’s actions constituted a waiver of his right to
present mitigating evidence, and therefore, the prejudice prong of the
Strickland test could not be established.96  Rather than accept the Com-
monwealth’s invitation to extend Schriro beyond its facts, the Third Circuit
explained that unless a defendant’s actions clearly manifest a desire to
90. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s guidance on waiving the presenta-
tion of mitigating evidence, see infra notes 95–117. R
91. See Blystone, 664 F.3d at 425 (“[W]e could not conclude on the record
before us that Thomas would have interfered with the presentation of all mitigat-
ing evidence.”).
92. For a discussion of recent Third Circuit cases on presenting mitigating
evidence, see supra notes 56–86 and accompanying text. R
93. For a discussion of the effect of Blystone on a defendant’s waiver of the
right to present mitigating evidence, see infra notes 95–117 and accompanying
text.
94. For a discussion of the practical impact of the Third Circuit’s decision in
Blystone on defense counsel’s investigation and presentation of mitigating evi-
dence, see infra notes 118–129 and accompanying text.
95. See Blystone, 664 F.3d at 426 (limiting applicability of Schriro by highlight-
ing language used in Supreme Court’s decision: “ ‘[i]n the constellation of refusals
to have mitigating evidence presented . . . [Schriro] is surely a bright star’”) (altera-
tions in original) (citation omitted).
96. See Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105, 126 (3d Cir. 2009) (explaining Com-
monwealth’s position that even if counsel’s investigation was unreasonable, no
prejudice resulted because, like in Schriro and Taylor, defendant had completely
relinquished his right to present mitigating evidence).
14
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waive the right to present all mitigating evidence, no valid waiver exists
that would bar a defendant from presenting such evidence during
sentencing.97
Blystone further solidified this reasoning, holding that even when the
record provides room for a reasonable interpretation that the defendant
tried to issue a complete waiver of the right to present mitigating evi-
dence, a plausible alternative explanation for the defendant’s actions may
be sufficient to prevent the court from imputing a waiver to the defen-
dant.98  For example, the Third Circuit may not impute a waiver if the
defendant thought that the refusal to present mitigating evidence only ex-
tended to a specific type of evidence and not to all evidence.99  As a result,
unless the defendant unequivocally relinquishes the right to present miti-
97. See id. at 128–29 (explaining that case does not resemble Schriro because
defendant did not make “affirmative declaration against the presentation of all
mitigating evidence”) (emphasis added).
98. See Blystone, 664 F.3d at 425–26 (citing Thomas while rejecting invitation to
extend Schriro’s reasoning to facts that do not contain direct affirmation of waiver
of right to present any and all mitigating evidence).  In Thomas, the Third Circuit
articulated the view that even if a defendant’s particular action or decision may
lend credence to the argument that the defendant intended to waive the right to
present mitigating evidence, if there is a plausible alternative argument that does
not involve the intent to waive the right to present mitigating evidence, the Court
will protect the defendant by crediting the alternative argument. See Thomas, 570
F.3d at 128–29 (explaining plausible, alternative explanations, other than intent to
establish complete waiver of right to present mitigating evidence in regards to de-
fendant’s refusal to put on specific type of mitigating evidence).  Specifically, in
Thomas the defendant refused the Commonwealth’s offer to stipulate his age and
that he graduated from high school. See id. at 112 (describing facts of case).  When
the Third Circuit was asked to decide whether the defendant had a claim for inef-
fective assistance of counsel, one of the Commonwealth’s arguments that the de-
fendant was not prejudiced was that the defendant’s refusal to stipulate to these
harmless facts indicated that he intended to fully waive his right to present mitigat-
ing evidence. See id. at 127 (explaining Commonwealth’s argument).  The Third
Circuit acknowledged that the defendant’s actions were consistent with the Com-
monwealth’s argument but ultimately rejected the argument because other plausi-
ble explanations existed for the defendant’s actions:
Nor does Thomas’ refusal to stipulate to his age and education tip the
scales in the Commonwealth’s favor.  We agree with the Commonwealth
that Thomas’ age and education are relatively innocuous facts, and
Thomas’ decision not to stipulate to them is odd.  We cannot agree, how-
ever, that this proves that Thomas was not prejudiced.  While Thomas’
refusal to stipulate is consistent with the Commonwealth’s position, it is
equally consistent with other scenarios that the record supports. . . .
Thomas’ failure to stipulate could be viewed as a symptom of this funda-
mental misunderstanding, and not as an affirmative declaration against
the presentation of all mitigating evidence.
Id. at 128–29.
99. See Thomas, F.3d at 128–29 (providing example of situation when refusing
presentation of some evidence does not mean defendant refused to present any
evidence).
15
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gating evidence, the Third Circuit goes to great lengths to protect the de-
fendant from facing an inadvertent waiver.100
To clarify this analysis, the Third Circuit has flagged particular facts as
insufficient to supply the basis for a waiver of presentation of mitigating
evidence.101  For example, in both Thomas and Blystone, the trial judges
engaged the defendants in a colloquy during the sentencing hearing to
ensure that the defendant’s wishes regarding the presentation of mitigat-
ing evidence were satisfied.102  In Thomas, during the judge’s colloquy with
the defendant, the court posed a compound question: “And you already
told [your counsel], I would like to repeat, but it’s your decision not to
take the stand at this penalty stage of the hearing or even to present any
evidence.  Is that your independent and voluntary decision?”103  Although
the defendant responded in the affirmative, the court dismissed the Com-
monwealth’s argument that this exchange provided sufficient grounds to
support a complete waiver of the presentation of all mitigating evi-
dence.104  Instead, the court demonstrated that practitioners must focus
on the entire context in which the compound question was asked.105  Spe-
cifically, the inquiry should focus on whether it is plausible that the defen-
100. See Blystone, 664 F.3d at 426 (rejecting argument that because defendant
chose not to testify or to allow two of his family members to testify that that neces-
sarily meant he would have rejected defense counsel’s attempts to present other
pieces of mitigating evidence); Thomas, 570 F.3d at 129 (explaining that defen-
dant’s rejection of option to testify and to have other witnesses testify did not mean
that defendant would have rejected other forms of mitigating evidence).  The
Third Circuit’s approach was not evident following the ruling in Schriro, which left
commentators warning that Schriro left open the possibility that a defendant’s re-
jection of certain pieces of mitigating evidence could be wrongly treated as a com-
plete waiver to present all mitigating evidence. See Leading Cases, supra note 3, at R
255 (advocating against lower courts interpreting limited refusal to present some
mitigating evidence as complete refusal to use any type of mitigating evidence).
Additionally, the article advises against interpreting recalcitrant behavior as the
basis for concluding that the defendant intended to completely waive the right to
present mitigating evidence. See id. at 256 (advocating against courts equating re-
calcitrant behavior with intention to waive right to present all mitigating
evidence).
101. For a discussion of the key facts that the Third Circuit has deemed insuf-
ficient to constitute a complete waiver, see infra notes 102–10 and accompanying
text.
102. See Blystone, 664 F.3d at 403 (examining defendant’s colloquy with court
during sentencing hearing); Thomas, 570 F.3d at 128 (same).
103. Thomas, 570 F.3d at 128 (emphasis added) (reviewing transcript during
sentencing hearing).
104. See id. (“Thomas’ terse answer to this inquiry does not display an intent
to interfere with the presentation of mitigating evidence that is strong enough to
preclude a showing of prejudice.”).
105. See id. (determining that defendant’s colloquy was “focused narrowly on
whether he wanted to take the stand himself,” and that compound question did
not rise to level of waiver of right to present all mitigating evidence).
16
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dant intended only to waive the right to testify and not to waive the right
to present all other mitigating evidence.106
In Blystone, the trial judge asked the defendant a similar compound
question, “Do you wish to testify yourself or to have your parents testify or
to offer any other evidence in this case?”107  Because the defendant responded
in the negative to this broader question concerning any other evidence in
this case, the Third Circuit could have reasonably interpreted the re-
sponse as the defendant’s intent to completely waive his right to present
mitigating evidence.108  However, the court carefully unpacked the ques-
tions and determined that at most, the defendant intended to waive his
right to “all lay witness testimony,” but not his complete right to present
any mitigating information.109  Together, the colloquies in Thomas and
Blystone demonstrate that if there is any reasonable alternative explana-
tion, the Third Circuit will err on the side of caution and find that the
defendant did not intend to expand the waiver beyond the most limited
reasonable interpretation.110
Further, the Third Circuit acknowledges the Supreme Court’s posi-
tion that no “informed and knowing” requirement exists to waive the right
to present mitigating evidence.111  However, the Third Circuit makes it
clear that an informed and knowing decision is still relevant to the in-
quiry.112  Specifically, the court has referenced a defense counsel’s respon-
sibility to keep the defendant informed about decisions regarding the
presentation of mitigating evidence.113
106. See id. (demonstrating court’s broad view of circumstances surrounding
defendant’s purported waiver to determine scope of relinquishment of rights to
present evidence).
107. See Blystone, 664 F.3d at 403 (examining colloquy between defendant and
trial court during sentencing phase of case).
108. See id. (describing colloquy and specifically highlighting defendant’s re-
sponse to questions from trial judge regarding extent of defendant’s desire not to
present certain type of mitigating evidence).
109. See id. at 426 (“We believe it not only incorrect, but also unreasonable, to
infer from the colloquy that Blystone would have prevented counsel from present-
ing any mitigating evidence, regardless of the form that it took.”).
110. See id. (explaining that colloquy must be interpreted in its complete con-
text and exchange not expanded to mean more than is necessarily inferred).
111. See Thomas, 570 F.3d at 129 n.9 (“As a result, we offer no opinion on
whether a waiver of the right to present mitigating evidence must be ‘informed
and knowing.’”) (citation omitted).
112. See Blystone, 664 F.3d at 424 (explaining that Schriro and Taylor do not
control in case at hand by highlighting that defendants in both cases made it obvi-
ous that they understood consequence of their decisions not to present mitigating
evidence); Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416, 455–56 (3d Cir. 2007) (“We are also satis-
fied that Taylor’s decision not to present mitigating evidence was informed and
knowing.”).
113. See Blystone, 664 F.3d at 422 n.21 (“After all, counsel also has a duty to
provide advice upon which his client can make an informed decision not to pre-
sent evidence in mitigation.”).
17
Scher: Blystone v. Horn: The Third Circuit Guards Against Inadvertent Wa
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-5\VLR505.txt unknown Seq: 18 15-OCT-13 12:26
886 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58: p. 869
Finally, for a defendant to completely waive the right to present miti-
gating evidence, the Third Circuit requires an affirmative declaration indi-
cating a complete waiver.114  As discussed above, if a defendant rejects the
presentation of a particular piece of evidence, the court will not interpret
that action to mean that the defendant has offered a complete waiver.115
The defendant’s statement in Taylor, “ ‘I want the maximum sentence,’”
illustrates an affirmative declaration sufficient to constitute a complete
waiver.116  Practitioners should assume that nothing short of this type of
affirmative declaration is sufficient to establish a waiver.117
B. Effect of Possible Waiver on Counsel’s Investigatory Responsibility
In the Third Circuit, the duty to conduct an investigation for mitigat-
ing evidence exists independent of the duty to present mitigating evi-
dence.118  By distinguishing between the investigation into mitigating
evidence and the eventual presentation of the evidence, the Third Circuit
addressed an issue left open by the Supreme Court in Schriro.119  As a re-
114. See id. at 424–26 (explaining that Schriro and Taylor were not controlling
in Blystone in part because defendants in those cases made clear affirmative declara-
tions that they did not want to present any mitigating evidence and that they were
willing to face capital punishment).  Specifically, in Schriro the defendant said, “I
think if you want to give me the death penalty, just bring it right on.  I’m ready for
it.”  Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 470 (2007).
115. See Blystone, 664 F.3d at 426 (explaining that it would not be reasonable
to extend defendant’s limited waiver into complete waiver of right to present miti-
gating evidence); Thomas, 570 F.3d at 128 (“To us, the only thing that Thomas
clearly disclaimed at his colloquy was a desire to testify on his own behalf.”).
116. See Blystone, 664 F.3d at 424 (explaining that defendant’s actions in Taylor
were sufficient and clear enough to determine that defendant intended to com-
pletely waive his right to present mitigating evidence).
117. Compare Taylor, 504 F.3d at 435 (determining that affirmative declaration
that defendant wanted maximum sentence was enough for court to impute
waiver), with Blystone, 664 F.3d at 426 (indicating that defendant’s actions, specifi-
cally in regards to colloquy with judge, were not enough to constitute affirmative
declaration of complete waiver of right to present mitigating evidence), and
Thomas, 570 F.3d at 128–29 (explaining that defendant’s colloquy rejecting certain
type of mitigating evidence was not enough to serve as “an affirmative declaration
against the presentation of all mitigating evidence”).
118. See Blystone, 664 F.3d at 420 (explaining that duty to perform investiga-
tion exists independently from duty to present mitigating evidence at sentencing
hearing).  The Third Circuit further explained that the duty to perform an investi-
gation is necessary to consider what could or should be presented. See id. (“In fact,
the former is a necessary predicate to the latter: if counsel has failed to conduct a
reasonable investigation to prepare for sentencing, then he cannot possibly be said
to have made a reasonable decision as to what to present at sentencing.”).
119. See Nelan, supra note 4, at 34 (“The difference between the reasoning of R
the Court and the Ninth Circuit seemed to be that the Court treated the investiga-
tion and presentation of mitigating evidence as one right, whereas the Ninth Cir-
cuit saw them as two independent rights that could each give rise to a claim of
ineffective assistance.”).
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sult of this policy, requests by the defendant will not affect the defense
counsel’s duty to investigate mitigating evidence.120
Although beyond the scope of this brief, it is helpful to note where
practitioners may find the basic requirements for a reasonable investiga-
tion and presentation of mitigating evidence.121  The American Bar Asso-
ciation (ABA) produced a set of guidelines for capital cases that shape the
contours of what constitutes a reasonable investigation for mitigating evi-
dence.122  Notably, the Supreme Court has referred to the ABA Guide-
lines in multiple instances to illustrate the scope of a reasonable
investigation.123  Further, some commentators argue that the Guidelines
have all but “taken on the force of law.”124  Thus, the ABA Guidelines
provide a comprehensive, practical guide to conducting a reasonable in-
vestigation for mitigating evidence, and as such, they should be the first
reference point for defense teams in capital cases.125
120. See MacLean, supra note 55, at 666 (“The duty to investigate exists re- R
gardless of the expressed desires of a client.”).
121. For an overview of general guidelines supplied by the American Bar As-
sociation regarding proper mitigating evidence investigation, see infra notes
122–25 and the accompanying text. R
122. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 616 (“The [ABA] Guidelines and Supple- R
mentary [ABA] Guidelines have had a tremendous impact on developing norms
for the profession of mitigation specialists in the short time since their
publication.”).
123. See Cheng, supra note 38, at 49 (“Text from both the [ABA] rules and the R
commentary has been cited in US Supreme Court opinions.”).
124. See id. at 49–50 (examining Supreme Court’s adoption and approval of
certain sections of ABA guidelines especially in Wiggins v. Smith, Florida v. Nixon,
and Rompilla v. Beard).  Perhaps the clearest example of the Supreme Court’s affir-
mation of the importance of abiding by the ABA guidelines came in Wiggins. See
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (“[W]e long have referred [to the ABA
Standards] as ‘guides to determining what is reasonable.’”) (citation omitted); see
also John H. Blume & Stacey D. Neumann, “It’s Like Deja Vu All over Again”: Wil-
liams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla v. Beard and a (Partial) Return to the
Guidelines Approach to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 147
(2007) (“The jurisprudential shift is now evident and established.  Lower courts
must consider the ABA Guidelines and other national standards to determine the
reasonableness of counsel’s behavior in light of prevailing professional norms as
part of the ineffective assistance of counsel analysis.”).
125. See Cheng, supra note 38, at 50 (“Leading defense advocates insist that R
the Constitution’s guarantee of competent counsel requires adherence to the min-
imum requirements established in the standards.”).  As a result of the ABA Guide-
lines’ rise in significance, the importance of capital mitigation specialists has
increased dramatically over the past decade. See Emily Hughes, Mitigating Death, 18
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 337, 339 (2009) (“In the past eight years, the United
States Supreme Court has been vocal about the importance of capital mitigation
specialists in death penalty defense.”).  In fact, the ABA Guidelines require that a
defense team retain mitigation specialists. See Maher, supra note 3, at 770 (“[The
ABA Guidelines] made clear the absolute requirement that capital defenders re-
tain the assistance of a mitigation specialist as an essential member of any defense
team.”).  Mitigation specialists are experts at investigating mitigating evidence. See
Cooley, supra note 2, at 59 (“In general, mitigation specialists are those ‘qualified
by knowledge, skill, experience, or training as a mental health or sociology profes-
sional to investigate, evaluate, and present psychosocial and other mitigating evi-
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Additionally, practitioners must take care to distinguish between a de-
fendant’s refusal to present all mitigating evidence versus refusal to pre-
sent certain types of mitigating evidence.126  This distinction is critical
because unlike a blanket refusal to present mitigating evidence, a partial
refusal of certain types will not eliminate the possibility of an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.127  Based on the language and decision in
Schriro, the Third Circuit’s interpretation in favor of protecting the right to
present mitigating evidence in the face of a defendant’s seemingly con-
trary actions was not a clear or easy approach for an appellate court to
adopt.128  In effect, the conclusions produced by Thomas and Blystone serve
as reminders for practitioners that the duty to conduct a thorough investi-
gation of mitigating evidence persists irrespective of a defendant’s wishes
or actions with respect to the presentation of the evidence.129
dence to persuade the sentencing authority . . . that a death sentence is an
inappropriate punishment.’”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).  The
ABA Guidelines require that a mitigation specialist be appointed to the defense
team to help in the massive task of uncovering information from every facet of the
defendant’s life, including potentially critical factors spanning the range of poverty
and childhood abuse. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 591–601 (explaining require-
ment of mitigation specialist on defense team and type and scope of investigation
in which mitigation specialists are expected to engage).  Importantly, the ABA
Guidelines note that the ultimate responsibility of any presentation of mitigating
evidence rests on the defense counsel and not on the mitigation specialist. See
Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty
Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677, 688 (2008) (“Counsel decides how mitigation will
be presented.”).
126. See Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 426 (3d Cir. 2011).
The fact that Blystone chose to forego the presentation of his own testi-
mony and that of the two family members, which counsel was prepared to
put on the stand, simply does not permit the inference that, had counsel
competently investigated and developed expert mental health evidence
and institutional records, Blystone would have also declined their
presentation.
Id.; see also Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105, 128–29 (3d Cir. 2009) (explaining that
defendant’s refusal to present some evidence does not justify Commonwealth’s ar-
gument that defendant would have refused to present all mitigating evidence).
127. See Thomas, 570 F.3d at 128–29 (explaining that defendant’s refusal to
present some evidence does not negate the right to present other evidence); see
also Blystone, 664 F.3d at 426 (parroting argument expressed by court in Thomas).
128. See Leading Cases, supra note 3, at 264.  The article explains that because
of likely appellate court interpretations of Schriro, which the Third Circuit rejected,
[D]efendants face powerful pressures to allow their counsel to present all
possible mitigating evidence—including evidence they do not want
presented in a public court such as sexual abuse by family members—lest
they be deemed to have excused their counsel from any obligation to
discover other potentially mitigating evidence.
Id.
129. See Blystone, 664 F.3d at 420 (“As such, ‘our principal concern in deciding
whether [counsel] exercised “reasonable professional judgment” is not whether
counsel should have presented a mitigation case.  Rather, we focus on whether the
investigation supporting counsel’s decision not to introduce mitigating evidence of
[the defendant’s] background was itself reasonable.’”) (alterations in original) (cita-
tion omitted).
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V. THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S APPROACH APPROPRIATELY PROTECTS
CAPITAL DEFENDANTS’ RIGHTS
Not all circuits follow the Third Circuit in employing a significantly
limited approach to the application of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Schriro.130  Considering that a life hangs in the balance during the penalty
phase of a capital case and that it has been shown that poor representation
correlates with the imposition of the death penalty, the Third Circuit’s
approach appropriately takes significant precautions to ensure that the de-
fendant’s right to present mitigating evidence is vigorously protected.131
Still, the Third Circuit has the opportunity to expand these protections
even further.132
A. The Third Circuit Takes Step to Affirmatively Protect a Defendant’s Right to
Present Mitigating Evidence
By employing a strong presumption against waiver, the Third Circuit
properly protects defendants who may be inhibiting a defense counsel’s
ability to investigate or present mitigating evidence because of the defen-
dant’s particularly vulnerable position.133  Often defendants in capital
cases suffer from mental illnesses that may affect their capability to advise
130. See Ho, supra note 1, at 751 (“Indeed, several lower courts have already R
cited [Schriro] for the proposition that, where a defendant interferes with counsel’s
presentation of mitigating evidence in some way, that defendant has waived any
subsequent claim to ineffective assistance based on deficient performance at sen-
tencing.”); see also Newland v. Hall, 527 F.3d 1162, 1205, 1214 n.80 (11th Cir. 2008)
(determining that client’s instruction to defense counsel not to reach out to family
members as part of investigation for mitigating evidence was enough to bring case
within scope of Schriro).  In evaluating the client’s cooperation in the process of
compiling mitigating evidence and whether the client’s actions eliminated an inef-
fective representation claim by nullifying the Strickland prejudice prong, the Elev-
enth Circuit focused on whether the client’s actions were passive or active, not on
whether the client clearly rejected, or would have rejected, any and all mitigating
evidence at sentencing. See id. at 1205 (“While petitioner’s conduct in this case is
not as extreme as the defendant’s conduct in Schriro, we follow the Court in draw-
ing a distinction between a defendant’s passive non-cooperation and his active in-
struction to counsel not to engage in certain conduct.”).
131. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 585 (explaining that based on study of thirty R
capital defense attorneys conducted by Welsh S. White, “the worse the attorney’s
skills, the more certain a defendant will be sentenced to death”); see also Ho, supra
note 1, at 751 (explaining that certain interpretation of Schriro “presents an intoler- R
able risk that defendants will be sentenced to death based on an incomplete re-
cord); Leading Cases, supra note 3, at 263 (“It is unreasonable for a court to allow a
defendant to waive the right to present mitigating evidence unless the waiver ex-
pressly and unambiguously extends to all potential mitigating evidence.”).
132. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s possible expansion of the protec-
tions afforded to defendants with respect to waiving their right to present mitigat-
ing evidence, see infra notes 138–44 and accompanying text.
133. See MacLean, supra note 55, at 670 (“Experienced capital defense attor- R
neys commonly encounter clients who, at one point or another, object to the inves-
tigation or presentation of mitigation evidence.”).
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their attorneys in a prudent manner.134  In other cases, a defendant’s
judgment may be impaired from the debilitating effects of other underly-
ing issues such as poverty and sexual abuse.135  It is worth now reiterating
the importance of mitigating evidence because if no mitigating evidence is
presented, administration of the death penalty is all but a foregone con-
clusion.136  Although the Third Circuit has properly implemented an ap-
proach in favor of protecting defendants’ rights, the court could take this
protection even further while still remaining within the bounds of Su-
preme Court precedent.137
B. The Third Circuit Should Take the Next Step to Protect a Defendant’s Right
to Present Mitigating Evidence
At least one commentator disagrees with the majority’s ruling in
Schriro because it failed to adhere to the well-established convention that a
waiver of many constitutionally protected rights must be “knowing and vol-
untary.”138  The Third Circuit uses the knowing and voluntary standard as
a factor in evaluating whether recalcitrant defendants have waived their
right to present mitigating evidence; however, the court of appeals has
refrained from establishing an official position on whether the knowing
and voluntary standard is required for a valid waiver.139  Although the Su-
preme Court ruling in Schriro noted that the knowing and voluntary stan-
dard has never been used in the context of waiving the right to present
mitigating evidence, the decision did not foreclose lower courts from
134. See Nelan, supra note 4, at 28 (“[T]he evidence seems relatively clear that R
the thinking of many death row volunteers and in particular defendants who are
waiving their right to present mitigating evidence at a capital sentencing hearing is
influenced by a mental disorder and these individuals may be incompetent to
make such a decision.”); Leading Cases, supra note 3, at 256–62 (highlighting that R
defendants facing death penalty may exhibit abnormal behavior attributable to
mental health condition).
135. See Leading Cases, supra note 3, at 261 (explaining that large percentage R
of defendants are poor and many have suffered from physical and sexual abuse).
136. See Nelan, supra note 4, at 24 (explaining that defendants who choose R
not to present mitigating evidence will, in all likelihood, face death sentence).
137. For a discussion of how the Third Circuit can take their current line of
reasoning to the next logical level, see infra notes 138–44 and accompanying text. R
138. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 484 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (“It is well established that a citizen’s waiver of a constitutional right must be
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.”); Ho, supra note 1, at 732 (explaining that R
Supreme Court has consistently ruled that defendant’s waiver of certain constitu-
tionally protected trial rights such as right to a jury trial is invalid unless decision
was made knowingly and voluntarily).
139. See Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105, 129 n.9 (3d Cir. 2009) (acknowledg-
ing Supreme Court has not affirmatively declared whether waiver of mitigating
evidence must be knowing and voluntary and, “as a result, we offer no opinion on
whether a waiver of the right to present mitigating evidence must be ‘informed
and knowing’”).
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adopting the standard as a prerequisite to a valid waiver.140  It is well-set-
tled that when waiving other constitutional rights, defendants are afforded
the protection of the knowing and voluntary standard.141
Since the decision in Schriro, lower courts have been hesitant to em-
brace the knowing and voluntary standard as a requirement to waive the
right to present mitigating evidence.142  However, given the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence requiring the knowing and voluntary standard to
waive other constitutional rights, and considering Schriro’s open-ended
language permitting such an interpretation, the Third Circuit should use
its discretionary power to establish the knowing and voluntary standard as
a mandatory requirement for a defendant to waive the right to present
mitigating evidence.143  Finally, it should be noted that the “knowing, in-
telligent, and voluntary” standard would not be unfamiliar in the Third
Circuit because prior to Schriro, courts within the Third Circuit employed
this very standard in this context.144
VI. CONCLUSION
In sum, the Third Circuit correctly rejected the Supreme Court’s invi-
tation to significantly expand the scope of a defendant’s waiver of the
right to present mitigating evidence.145  One of the Supreme Court’s pri-
140. See Ho, supra note 1, at 732 (explaining that decision did not bar lower R
courts from creating knowing and voluntary standard when addressing validity of
waivers of right to present mitigating evidence).
141. See Schriro, 550 U.S. at 484 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that “knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary” standard are staples in Supreme Court’s waiver jurispru-
dence).  “As far back as Johnson v. Zerbst, we held that courts must ‘indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver’ of fundamental constitutional rights.” Id.;
see also Ho, supra note 1, at 732–33 (listing examples of constitutional rights that R
defendants may waive but emphasizing that this type of “waiver is permitted only if
it is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary”).
142. See Ho, supra note 1, at 721–22 (“Given the confusion amongst the lower R
courts on this issue, the establishment of a knowing and voluntary requirement in
this context makes sense not only from a perspective of judicial economy, but also
to minimize the number of capital defendants sentenced to death without present-
ing a case in mitigation . . . .”).
143. See id. at 760–62 (arguing that Supreme Court should affirmatively adopt
“knowing and voluntary” standard for waivers of right to present mitigating evi-
dence, but until Supreme Court issues this ruling, lower courts should take it upon
themselves to adopt such standard).
144. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Davido, 868 A.2d 431, 443 (Pa. 2005)
(“Rather, in Pennsylvania, a capital defendant may waive the right to present miti-
gating evidence, so long as the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.”);
Commonwealth v. Randolph, 873 A.2d 1277, 1282 (Pa. 2005) (“[A] capital defen-
dant may waive the right to present mitigating evidence, so long as the waiver was
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.”) (citation omitted).
145. See Leading Cases, supra note 3, at 255 (“Courts should not expand a lim- R
ited refusal to present only some mitigating evidence into a complete refusal to
present any mitigating evidence, nor should they allow recalcitrant behavior at
sentencing to justify eradication of a defendant’s constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel.”).  The Third Circuit’s decision to limit Schriro’s application
fits within the Supreme Court guidance because Schriro left the requirements of
23
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mary concerns in the 1970s when deciding the constitutionality of the
death penalty statutes was whether the death penalty would be adminis-
tered in an arbitrary manner.146  Because of the many variables affecting a
defendant during the sentencing phase (e.g., mental illness, prior abuse,
and poverty), the Third Circuit recognized that expanding a defendant’s
limited rejection to presenting certain evidence into a complete waiver
would add to the arbitrariness that commentators argue already plagues
the system.147
lower courts open-ended, allowing discretion in deciding when a defendant com-
pletely waives a right to present mitigating evidence. See id. at 262–63 (explaining
that court left open issue of whether waiver needs to be knowing and informed:
“The majority thus sidestepped the well-established principle that courts are sup-
posed to ‘indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver’ of fundamental
constitutional rights.”) (citation omitted).
146. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 274 (1972) (“[T]he State must not
arbitrarily inflict a severe punishment.”).  Prior to Gregg, the Supreme Court invali-
dated death penalty statutes for a failure to control unbridled discretion that al-
lowed for arbitrary uses of capital punishment, as the arbitrary nature of the
penalty ran afoul of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment. See id. at 241–44 (explaining that historical underpinnings of Eighth
Amendment such as English Bill of Rights of 1689 were focused on disallowing
“arbitrary and discriminatory penalties of a severe nature”).
147. See Leading Cases, supra note 3, at 261–62. R
Defendants in capital cases commonly suffer from a variety of mental vul-
nerabilities.  Many defendants are poor and a large percentage are vic-
tims of physical and sexual abuse.  Capital defendants who opt to forego
appeals or not to present mitigating evidence are especially likely to suf-
fer from severe mental illness.  These death penalty “volunteers” often
change their minds about their course of action.  As a consequence,
courts must be extremely careful to consider the context of a defendant’s
recalcitrant or obstructive behavior or apparent willingness to be put to
death before deciding that it constitutes an informed and competent de-
cision to waive the right to present mitigating evidence.
Id.
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